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Abstract 
Managerialism – the notion that the primary skills required to manage 
any specific organisation are a generic set of managerial skills – is now 
widespread in the New Zealand public service. Managerialism was 
enabled by the 1988 State Sector Act, especially that part establishing 
the fixed-term contracts and appointments of chief executives. The 
consequences have been a decline in departmental expertise and 
a public service which acts as a secretariat for the government 
of the day. Thus, New Zealand has shifted from a mandarin to a 
valet public service. Managerialism is identified by top appointees 
who lack specialist skills and sector experience, short employment 
durations, and the manner in which the State Services Commission 
has managed the reform process thus far.
Keywords managerialism, state sector reform, fixed-term chief 
executive contracts, valet
 
From Mandarin to 
Valet Public Service? 
State sector reform and problems 
Managerialism is an ideology of management which has spread worldwide across the private 
and the public sectors. It is one of several 
core components of the loosely defined 
New Public Management model, which 
has been very influential in New Zealand 
(see Boston, 2016). Indeed, New Zealand 
is generally agreed to have adopted a 
relatively strong version of the New Public 
Management model, a move which was 
followed by few other countries. 
According to managerialist ideology, 
the role of a manager is to organise generic 
inputs to produce generic outputs. Perhaps 
the core belief of managerialist ideology is 
that the tasks of coordinating organisations 
share strong and important generic aspects. 
Running a museum is pretty much the 
same as running a hospital, or a Ministry 
of Defence, or an economic agency. Hence, 
the task of enhancing performance of all 
organisations can be driven by the 
application of generic management 
notions (Klikauer, 2015, pp.1104, 1107). 
These generic skills are embodied in a class 
of people. To such a class, experience, 
knowledge and skills relevant to the core 
area of any specific organisation are 
nugatory, or at least secondary. 
of managerialism 
in the New Zealand 
public service
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The implication of the generic skills 
view of coordination is that the need for 
managers in a particular job to possess a 
great deal of specific knowledge – be that 
knowledge technical, organisational, 
societal or institutional – is very limited. 
The consequence is that high job turnover, 
and low amounts of job-specific 
organisational expertise, of managers is not 
perceived as a significant problem.
Because managers often lack such 
forms of experience, knowledge and skills, 
their comparative advantages in practice 
lie in controlling all forms of information 
flows passing up and down through the 
hierarchy. Those who have experience, 
knowledge and skills are a threat to be 
downgraded and isolated from other 
information and from decision making 
where necessary, and eliminated where 
possible. Managerialism is also often 
associated with unrelenting corporate 
restructuring, as this is one of the generic 
skills many managers come to possess. 
Managerialism, of course, thrives best in 
an environment where outputs and 
outcomes are multiple, costly to observe 
and considerably lag behind changes in 
inputs and organisational forms. Under 
these circumstances, accountability for 
decisions is notably weak. A manager 
acquires a reputation as an efficient ‘change 
manager’ for his or her restructuring – 
altering the coordination of inputs – 
regardless of whether the change has borne 
genuine fruit. As long as that person cleaves 
to the received wisdoms of the managerial 
class, they can move on to the next such 
project or organisation with no fear of 
owning much in the way of negative 
consequence on their cv. 
This article argues that managerialism 
has become the dominant ideology at the 
top of the New Zealand public service, and 
that this was enabled to a substantial degree 
by the 1988 State Sector Act. The 
consequence has been the creation of a 
variety of  significant problems. 
Managerialism has contributed to creating 
an environment where the quality of long-
term decision making is poor (on this issue 
in a parliamentary context see Boston, 
Bagnall and Barry, 2019), where the public 
service is increasingly functioning as a 
secretariat for the government of the day 
rather than providing expert-informed free 
and frank advice, and where public policy 
advice has become increasingly politicised 
in nature. The article argues that 
managerialism has been critically enabled 
by one important deliberate change 
ushered in by the State Sector Act. 
However, the problem of managerialism 
is not acknowledged at any point in the State 
Services Commission’s discussion document 
provided as background to inform the 
ongoing process of state sector reform 
which commenced in 2018; indeed, the 
opposite. The document envisages a bigger 
dose of the same problematic medicine:
The performance of agencies does need 
a core of leaders with long experience 
and deep knowledge in a particular role 
or function. However, our judgement 
is that to date the pendulum has swung 
too far in that direction and greater 
mobility and flexible deployment is 
needed for the development of system 
leaders. (State Services Commission, 
2018, p.30)
Intriguingly, the above paragraph 
proposes that there has been a discernible 
trend in recent history towards public 
leaders with long experience and deep 
knowledge of a particular role or function 
which, sensibly, now needs to be balanced 
out by more mobility and flexibility. Many 
would argue that the historical trend post-
1988 has been in a diametrically opposed 
direction. The short version of the same 
document also suggests that a commitment 
to a permanent restructuring mindset is 
desirable: ‘What if we could rearrange our 
Public Services like building blocks? 
Imagine how quickly and easily we could 
shift our people and resources to cope with 
changing times and needs.’
Just, indeed, imagine! This article takes 
the opposite view. Public services are not, 
even as a metaphor, generic building blocks 
for the commission to reconfigure at will 
in response to always imperfectly perceived 
changed times and needs. If such a vision 
were implemented it would likely worsen, 
rather than solve, the managerialism which 
has led to the problems identified above.
The State Sector Act 1988 changed the 
constitutional balance between the public 
sector and the executive
In comparison with other developed 
countries, New Zealand is recognised as 
having a very powerful executive branch. 
There are relatively weak formal checks 
and balances on the executive provided by 
the legislature or the judiciary, or by local 
government, which has limited powers 
and is legally subordinate to central 
government.
In these circumstances some of the 
necessary constraints on the powerful 
executive branch are thought – in theory at 
least – to be provided by several different 
supporting government institutions. The 
first important constraint on the executive 
is via the democratic will of the people, 
expressed over a relatively short three-year 
electoral term. A second major constraint is 
high legislated levels of transparency 
imposed upon the executive by the Official 
Information Act 1982 and the Public 
Finance Act 1989. The last constraint is one 
which is directly related to the topic of this 
article: a major constitutional constraint on 
executive power in New Zealand is the 
quality and professionalism of senior public 
This shift to fixed-term contracts … [has] 
had serious adverse consequences in 
terms of undermining both free and frank 
advice and … department[s] having a 
strategic policy view independent of the 
government of the day.
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servants, including the auditor-general, the 
ombudsman and the state services 
commissioner, as well as their agencies.
Key features of the public service 
reforms surrounding the 1988 State Sector 
Act were the delegation of managerial 
powers to the chief executives of 
government departments and a redefinition 
of the relationship between ministers and 
departments. The state services 
commissioner was given responsibilities 
for making these arrangements work. Of 
particular importance were the protection 
of ministerial decision-making rights, and 
the professional independence of policy 
advice and management of the department. 
In ensuring that these arrangements 
were not undermined by inappropriate 
politicisation, attention was given to the 
arrangements for selecting and appointing 
chief executives. In the 1988 act and prior 
legislation there were apparent safeguards 
against the politicisation of the 
management of the public service. A major 
shift, however, was embodied in section 
38(1) of the State Sector Act. Here the act 
changed the employment relationship 
from permanent employment of chief 
executives to a situation where chief 
executives were given a maximum 
employment contract of five years (in 
practice, contracts have ranged between 
three and five years, with total maximum 
tenure typically being eight years). The 
rationale for employing chief executives on 
radically different terms from most of their 
staff is somewhat opaque.
There are two places for possible 
political pressures in this appointments 
process. Prior to any search for candidates, 
ministers confer with the state services 
commissioner about the skills required for 
each chief executive position. The 
commissioner then hires on the basis of 
criteria developed not for the long term 
but by (and for) the minister of the day. At 
the other end of the process, having made 
a recommendation for a chief executive, 
there is a further political hoop for the 
commission to jump through: before being 
signed off by the governor-general, the 
state services commissioner’s decision then 
goes through Cabinet for approval. 
There is further scope for political 
pressures following appointment. Once 
chief executives are in place, ministers are 
consulted on their performance 
expectations at the start of the performance 
year, and at the end of the annual cycle give 
their feedback to the commission.
Over the years and exploiting these 
parts of the 1988 act, ministers have 
arguably slowly acquired more influence 
over chief executive appointments, and 
hence directions of public sector agencies, 
without any public discussion of the 
constitutional implications of such 
changes. 
That greater political influence resulted 
from the shift to fixed-term chief executive 
contracts is perhaps not, in retrospect, 
surprising. Academics Christopher Hood 
and Michael Jackson were drawing the 
same, and in this case predictive, 
conclusions decades ago: 
Emphasis on term contracts for public 
managers weakens the impact of 
experience and independent advice on 
public policy making. … such a system 
can produce the conditions for 
‘groupthink’ … a term-contract 
approach … is not likely to create the 
qualities of independence and dissent 
that are needed to provide antidotes to 
groupthink. (Hood and Jackson, 1992, 
p.121)
Reappointment is another route to 
politicisation. In the last few decades most 
governments have lasted several terms; the 
last three completed governments have 
lasted three terms. This pattern means 
chief executives know that there is a good 
chance that their term will expire, and 
reappointment become a prospect, under 
the executive wing of the government of 
the day. 
At the same time, the independent 
power of departmental chief executives vis-
à-vis ministers has been undermined by 
other consequences of managerialism. As 
they nimbly flit from agency to agency and 
job to job on their path upwards, chief 
executives no longer have the mana – the 
wisdom, knowledge and experience 
garnered by a long career within the agency 
they ultimately run – to resist the 
ministerial power.
To illustrate the explicit recognition of 
this constitutional power shift towards the 
executive, it is worth paying attention to a 
speech by Jonathan Coleman, at the time 
minister of state services (Coleman, 2013). 
As a representative of the executive, 
Coleman presented the New Zealand 
practice of having the minister sign off the 
‘person specification’ to guide a chief 
executive appointment as a major 
improvement to the Westminster model 
because it increased ministerial influence 
in the senior appointment process. In his 
speech Coleman also extolled the virtues, 
from an executive perspective, of the fixed-
term employment contracts for chief 
executives: it gets them to perform and 
implement directions set by ministers. 
Lastly, and without apparent irony, 
Coleman commented favourably on the 
political neutrality of the New Zealand 
public service.
This shift to fixed-term contracts, and 
the playing out of its implications over 
time, have had serious adverse 
consequences in terms of undermining 
both free and frank advice and the notion 
of a department having a strategic policy 
view independent of the government of the 
day. The result has been a transformation 
of the public service from a body with a 
circumscribed but important degree of 
independence into a secretariat for the 
government of the day. Indeed, largely 
because of this change in the nature of the 
employment relationship at the top, the 
last three decades have, arguably, seen a 
transition from a mandarin to a valet 
public service.
Table 1: Employment durations in current job of state sector chief executives, as at 
07/08/2019, N=34, years
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
2.2 1.9 0.1 7.2
Source: State Services Commission, 2019
Table 2: Employment durations in current job of state sector senior leadership teams, 
N=202 (excluding chief executives), years
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
2.3 1.9 0.1 13.0
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The system of fixed-term chief executive 
employment also delivers major power to 
shape the public service to the kingpin in 
the appointments process, the state services 
commissioner. With more than 30 
departmental chief executives on the books, 
a commissioner will be involved in more 
than six appointments or reappointments 
per year on average (sometimes more), or 
one every eight weeks. If in the job for eight 
years, he or she will likely have appointed 
or reappointed every other chief executive 
bar him or herself.
Senior appointments, specialist expertise 
and managerialism
With the arrival of fixed-term chief 
executive appointments and the growth 
of ministerial influence over the process, 
a further pattern has been the significant 
number of senior appointments of people 
who, arguably, lack significant dimensions 
of sector- or institution-specific expertise. 
As already mentioned, this shift to 
inexperience has also contributed to a 
change in the balance of constitutional 
power between the public service and the 
executive branch.
The problem of the devaluation of deep 
sectoral or subject expertise, reasoned 
thought and informed policy advocacy in 
government is endemic. The devaluation of 
specialist expertise can be illustrated at the 
very top. The head of the government’s 
largest economic agency, the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment, has 
a background not in public policy analysis 
and economics but in service delivery and 
human resources. The most recent previous 
secretary to the Treasury, who left the agency 
and New Zealand recently under a bit of a 
cloud, was appointed with an extremely 
modest knowledge of New Zealand society, 
institutions and culture. While past heads 
of the Treasury have had postgraduate 
qualifications in economics (typically a 
doctorate), his highest qualification in 
economics was an undergraduate degree. 
The new appointee, while bringing with her 
stronger economic qualifications, has 
virtually no knowledge of New Zealand’s 
society, institutions and culture. 
The person running Te Papa, our 
national museum, is not trained in 
museums and heritage, but previously ran 
a district health board in south Auckland. 
Not surprisingly, he has been restructuring, 
the third time in five years this has 
happened at Te Papa, partly by sacking 
people with long tenure and expertise. The 
role of the chief archivist, the custodian of 
another core part of our national memory, 
has been reduced to a third-tier 
management position in the Department 
of Internal Affairs. The current incumbent 
has a background in information 
technology, not archives. 
The most recent experience of the 
person recently appointed to run the 
Ministry for Primary Industries – a role 
which requires advising government on 
complex policy issues dealing with 
interactions involving agriculture, science, 
economics and the environment – was 
running the Department of Corrections. 
The most recent appointment to run the 
Ministry of Justice, while a very experienced 
public servant, is not a qualified lawyer. 
We have a chief statistician, who 
recently resigned because of the bungled 
2018 census, who is not a statistician. We 
have a chief executive of LINZ who has no 
background in mapping or surveying. We 
have had a recent Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade chief executive who 
lacked both international relations and 
core public service experience. We have a 
chief executive at Defence with no 
background in foreign affairs or in the 
military. We have a chief executive of the 
Ministry for the Environment with no 
training in science or the environment. 
In addition to numerous appointees 
lacking what might seem to some to be 
necessary specialist expertise, chief 
executives have had limited opportunity to 
acquire these institutional and subject-
specific skills on the job. Table 1 shows that 
of the 34 departmental chief executives, the 
average chief executive has been in his or 
her job for only two years. If chief executive 
positions are complex ones with a high 
degree of specificity, requiring long 
learning curves on the job, this short mean 
job duration is highly problematic.  
Perhaps, while not being present at the 
highest level of the organisation, the 
institutional experience is held among 
other members of state sector senior 
leadership teams? This possibility was 
addressed by collecting data on that group 
for examination. Two hundred and thirty 
senior managers from matching 
departmental senior leadership teams were 
-5% 
5% 
15% 
25% 
35% 
45% 
1
9
6
0
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
8
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
6
 
Figure 1: The annual chance of being in a restructured department doubles following the 1988 State Sector Act 
Chance of being in a restructured department Average 1960-1987 Average 1988-2017 
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identified by name from the respective 
departmental websites. Between 7 and 12 
August 2019, LinkedIn and the Google 
search engine were used, where possible, to 
identify the person’s duration in the 
position. Twenty-eight senior managers’ 
current job durations were unable to be 
identified in the data collection process; 
however, data are still available on 202 of 
them – just over 84%. What is striking in 
examining the patterns in the senior 
leadership data, as Table 2 shows, is how 
similar senior leadership teams are to their 
chief executives on average in their job 
durations. They have very low mean job 
durations, similarly about two years. Again, 
these people are likely to be in complex 
jobs with long learning curves.
Managerialism and restructuring
Managerialism is a major force behind 
the endless restructurings identified as a 
problem by my colleagues Masashi Yui and 
Bob Gregory (2018). Yui and Gregory show 
that between 1960 and 1987, as illustrated 
in Figure 1, on average 3.8 government 
departments were restructured a year. 
Following the introduction of the State 
Sector Act, the figure has risen to 8.1 
departments annually on average between 
1988 and 2017. The last decade has seen 
6.5 departments restructured annually 
on average. It is noteworthy that internal 
restructurings are beyond the scope of Yui 
and Gregory’s study, but it is almost certain 
that they too rose following the 1988 act.
Why so much restructuring? Lacking in 
specialist skills and institutional knowledge, 
generic managers have few tools in the kit, 
bar restructuring. Hence, restructuring 
becomes reflex. Restructuring kills valuable 
networks, eliminates core institutional 
knowledge and demoralises staff. In short, 
the ability to offer reasoned independent 
advice is eroded. Because of high 
interdepartmental turnover rates, often 
managers do not remain in their agency to 
allow the full fruits of their restructuring 
actions to be assessed. Even then, gains from 
restructuring are difficult to observe, 
making accountability a challenge. 
The ad hoc restructurings identified 
here as a consequence of managerialism 
have resulted in a lack of long-tenured staff 
in most agencies, loss of institutional 
memory, and elimination of a clear 
pathway of promotion in one agency from 
hiring as a graduate to the top position. 
They have contributed to the systematic 
corrosion and devaluation of specialist 
advisory and delivery expertise at all levels 
of government. 
The lack of expertise – in terms both of 
institutional knowledge and subject skills 
– among generic managers means they get 
little respect from their staff for having 
been there and done that, have little ability 
to provide knowledge leadership, and lack 
skills to perform necessary staff training 
and guidance. Expert knowledge on the 
part of staff in one’s team becomes more a 
threat than an advantage, as it risks 
upsetting the minister’s agenda, the kiss of 
death for the ambitious generalist.
Generic managers do not know the 
nuts and bolts of their organisations, and 
their strengths and weaknesses. 
Consequently, they too frequently manage 
ignorantly and upwards, not using 
information from lower down and tightly 
controlling information flowing down 
from further up the hierarchy, since this is 
one of their few points of systemic leverage. 
Public sector workers, while well motivated 
and satisfied, do not rate their managers’ 
and organisations’ performance highly, 
suggesting that reforms have not led to 
quality management and well-run 
organisations (Plimmer et al., 2017, p.28).
Managerialism also appears to 
encourage a focus on ‘selling’ and 
presentation rather than policy substance. 
Performance assessment becomes less 
about performance and more about 
spinning imperfectly observed outputs. 
Much resource has been devoted to such 
efforts inside agencies, including the 
considerable growth of departmental 
communications teams (Pennington, 
2019). A brief consideration of current 
departmental annual reports and briefings 
to incoming ministers, full of photographs 
and glossy pages but light on genuine 
content, and comparing them with similar 
reports 30 years ago, illustrates this 
dimension of the problem. Further research 
on these issues would be interesting.
The 2018 state sector reform process as an 
illustration of the managerialist problem
Not surprisingly, many serious problems in 
the public service have been reflected in the 
current state sector reform process as it has 
manifested itself so far. The public service 
is not in great shape to deliver high-quality 
policy advice to facilitate a considered 
and intellectually rigorous programme 
for reform. The central state agencies of 
Treasury, the State Services Commission 
and the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, those historically primarily 
responsible for coordination and for 
driving the public service intellectually, 
have experienced extremely high staff 
turnover rates since the beginning of 
the millennium, under each of the last 
four state services commissioners. Table 
3 shows that in all four regimes turnover 
rates in all three central agencies have been 
significantly higher than in the state sector 
as a whole. In particular, long-standing 
high turnover rates have been a feature of 
the State Services Commission, the lead 
agency for state sector reform.
If skills are largely generic and specific 
skills rapidly acquired, high turnover is 
unproblematic. However, reforming the 
institutions of government and their 
interactions and engaging in strategic 
restructuring is a unique opportunity, 
where the availability and utilisation of 
those with intellectual wheels and deep 
The result has been a transformation of 
the public service from a body with a 
circumscribed but important degree of 
independence into a secretariat for the 
government of the day.
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institutional knowledge is likely to be 
critical to the success of the project.
Additionally, staff turnover has direct 
and indirect costs, of between 90% and 
200% of gross salary (Hom et al., 2017). 
There are the costs of bringing a new person 
up to speed in an organisation, including 
on-the-job learning, training and extra 
management time. Furthermore, the morale 
of and engagement by those who don’t leave 
may decline. Then there are the considerable 
costs of lost built-up skills, routines and 
networks of those who leave. 
Considering capacity to drive high-
quality reform in another of the central 
agencies, there have been several recent 
trenchant criticisms of Treasury’s capacity. 
One commentator has recently concluded 
that within Treasury ‘technical expertise 
has declined, … technical expertise is no 
longer highly respected in Treasury, and … 
some teams in Treasury do not view 
analytical and quantitative skills as being 
important in policy work’ (Crampton, 
2018). Indicators of stakeholder satisfaction 
with Treasury, which were already weak in 
2015, have declined further in 2017 (see 
Table 4). The deterioration in stakeholder 
satisfaction has occurred despite Treasury 
staffing increasing significantly by 17% 
from 232 policy analysts in 2015 to 272 
policy analysts in 2017 (State Services 
Commission (n.d.)).
In an environment of limited analytical 
capacity, the ‘once in a generation’ reform 
opportunity has been led by the state 
services commissioner. While a very 
experienced public servant, having worked 
across a range of departments, the current 
commissioner’s employment has largely 
been in agencies where the primary role 
was service delivery, with policy secondary 
(Health, Social Development and 
Education). His career success has most 
notably involved successfully managing 
departments mired in public controversy 
out of controversy, away from critical 
public and political attention. 
Unsurprisingly, given how rare such 
opportunities are and where the 
commissioner has worked, he has little 
background in leading analytically complex, 
central agency-driven structural reform. 
The commissioner has not yet developed 
a wide reputation for overcoming these 
limitations by surrounding himself with 
and listening to challenging, ideas-driven 
people. 
The current senior leadership team at 
the State Services Commission is very 
much built in the mould of their leader. Of 
the eight people on it, five (including the 
deputy state services commissioner and the 
following other deputy commissioners: 
system and agency performance; workforce 
and talent management; Office of the Head 
of State Services; corporate services) 
worked for the commissioner at some 
point during his time as chief executive of 
the Ministry of Social Development 
between 2001 and 2011. Equally, 25%, or 
six (Corrections, Education Review Office, 
Education, Primary Industries, Social 
Development, Social Investment Agency) 
out of 24, permanent or acting chief 
executive appointees of the current 
commissioner had previously worked for 
him at the Ministry of Social Development. 
Such patterns of senior appointments raise 
serious questions about systemic 
commitments to diversity. 
There is little specialist expertise to 
drive reform at the top of the commission. 
Only one of the commission’s senior 
leadership team has experience in a central 
agency other than the commission, and 
then as a legal officer not as a policy analyst, 
and none seems to have worked as a policy 
analyst at the commission. 
The original project leader of the 
reform process was a previous deputy 
commissioner, with no central agency 
experience prior to his appointment. After 
several months running the once-in-a-
generation policy project, he left to help 
oversee aspects of the Provincial Growth 
Fund. Project leadership was delegated to 
another ex-Ministry of Social Development 
employee under the commissioner’s reign 
there, on short-term secondment from 
New Zealand Customs. Following this 
person’s return to his seconding agency, 
responsibility for leading the reform 
project was handed to a third person, a 
brand new deputy commissioner. This 
person had no central agency policy 
experience before her appointment.
It is therefore unsurprising that the 
policy documents arising out of such a 
generic environment, replete with high 
staff churn and with leadership lacking 
relevant experience, proved to be so limited 
in terms of problem definition, grasp of 
the evolution of the historical institutions, 
and analytical depth and nuance (see 
Chapple, Boston and Petrie, 2018 for a 
discussion).
Table 3: Gross staff turnover rates by central agency and by state services commissioner, 
annual percentages, 2001–18
Commissioner
Public 
service Treasury
State 
Services 
Commission DPMC
Wintringham, 2001–04 18.2 22.8 31.4 20.0
Prebble, 2005–08 20.8 23.0 33.3 22.4
Rennie, 2009–16 16.7 23.3 37.4 18.7
Hughes, 2017–18 17.0 28.1 31.8 23.6
Table 4: Declining stakeholder satisfaction with Treasury, selected indicators, 2015 and 
2017
2015 2017
Overall satisfaction with how Treasury interacts 63% 53%
Overall trust in Treasury 68% 61%
Staff were well informed 75% 66%
Overall confidence staff do a good job 77% 68%
Satisfaction with Treasury leadership role 48% 34%
Treasury challenges thinking on critical issues 58% 48%
Source: Treasury, 2017
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Conclusion
Managerialism seems to be widespread in 
the New Zealand public service, playing a 
significant role in transforming the public 
service from constrained independence 
with a focus on free and frank advice into, 
arguably, something approximating a 
secretariat, suitable for short-term policy 
implementation for the executive of the 
government of the day. As one public 
sector recruitment consultant summarised 
to me the message she was getting from the 
public service in terms of their staff needs 
in 2015: ‘the government wants doers, not 
thinkers’.
A key legislative change driving the 
managerialist ideology has been identified 
here as the shift to fixed-term employment 
contracts for chief executives in the 1988 
act. This change enabled the associated 
increasing politicisation of  the 
appointments process and the decline of a 
truly public service into a secretariat. The 
system took time to change in this direction, 
as those at senior levels who had 
internalised the norms of the old system 
gradually retired. Short-term contracts at 
the top of the pyramid have eventually 
bred short-termism as an organisational 
goal. Always keeping the minister of the 
day happy has become the core priority. 
The state sector reform initiatives from 
2018 have failed to acknowledge, let alone 
address, this major problem.
The old public service staff training 
model of ‘build, not buy’ has been nearly 
universally abandoned for the buy-and-
churn managerialist option, with the tone 
being set at the top. Indeed, buy-and-churn 
is positively celebrated with happy 
adjectives like ‘nimble’, ‘fleet-footed’ and 
‘responsive’. In perusing material from the 
commission, it seems that the official view 
is that more buy-and-churn and more 
generic management is desirable. 
Those in the public service who 
privately have concerns about the 
dominant managerialist ideology (and 
there will be some) – almost by definition 
those with more independent, creative and 
imaginative minds – keep their heads down 
and collect their pay, as expression of their 
voice will not be career-enhancing, or exit 
the public sector pool. Groupthink is 
reinforced.
Even if eliminating the worst of 
managerialism becomes a focus for change, 
it will not readily be rooted out of the 
public service for years, since its minions, 
embodying the managerialist norms, are 
firmly ensconced in situ among serried 
ranks of senior and middle management. 
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